The dangers of over-securitization

There has been a noticeable decline in the number of Chinese international students studying in Canada post-COVID. According to IRCC data, there were 140,537 Chinese study permit holders in Canada in 2019, but by 2023 that number had dropped to 102,148. This decline does not necessarily indicate that Canada has lost its appeal to Chinese students. Rather, it may reflect a more structural shift in China’s international education landscape.  

Research suggests that a paradoxical relationship exists between a country’s per capita GDP and young people’s propensity to study abroad. Specifically, once per capita income reaches a certain threshold, interest in overseas education tends to decline. Based on evidence from four Asian economies (Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) whose outbound student mobility has already peaked, this threshold is estimated at approximately USD 30,000 in per capita income (in PPP terms). Beyond this level, demand for international education typically begins to weaken. 

According to projections from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s per capita GDP (PPP) is expected to exceed USD 30,000 within 2026, suggesting that China may enter a post-threshold stage thereafter. This interpretation is supported by the general downward trend in Chinese outbound education mobility. At its peak in 2019, there were over 700,000 Chinese students studying overseas. The number declined sharply during the pandemic, and post-pandemic recovery did not match the pre-pandemic growth speed.  

As more young people choose to pursue higher education within China, transnational education (TNE) is rapidly moving from the periphery to the centre of China’s higher education internationalisation agenda. TNE refers to the cross-border delivery of higher education programs in which students study in a country different from the awarding institution, typically through joint programs, branch campuses, or online provision. TNE programs in China, which typically offer both Chinese and foreign degrees, are increasingly attractive because they combine international exposure with a domestic credential that enhances employability in the Chinese labour market.  

This growing TNE demand is being reinforced by recent policy reforms in China that have granted universities greater autonomy, removed the previous enrolment cap of 1,200 students per joint program, and shortened the government approval timeline. These changes form part of China’s broader strategy to expand TNE enrolments from 800,000 to 8 million students, with a particular emphasis on high-quality STEM partnerships. These developments are unfolding against a shifting demographic backdrop. China’s population peaked in 2021 and has been in gradual decline since 2022, while official projections suggest that the higher education-aged population will peak around 2032. To keep more young people at home, the Chinese Ministry of Education approved a record 287 new joint institutes and programs in 2025, the highest annual total since 2013. With an increasingly supportive regulatory environment, the next 5 –10 years are likely to represent a critical window of opportunity for overseas TNE providers operating in China. But in comparison to countries such as the UK and Australia, Canadian universities seem to be very slow and hesitant to explore TNE opportunities in China, despite the fact that their finances are suffering due to declined international student enrollment. 

At the centre of this hesitation are Canada’s research security policies, put in place under the previous Liberal administration of Justin Trudeau. There was the Sensitive Technology Research Areas (STRA) list which includes fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum science, aerospace and advanced materials as strategically sensitive and high-risk. There was also a list of Named Research Organizations (NRO) which made researchers ineligible for federal funding when working in collaboration with these Chinese entities. Though research security concerns are valid, there remains a danger of over-securitization. Broad or ambiguously defined security frameworks lead universities to adopt overly cautious or risk-averse behaviors, thus reducing our opportunities in higher education collaboration with China and TNE in particular.  

Following Prime Minister Mark Carney’s January 2026 visit to China, there has not been any clear rollback or formal relaxation of Canada’s research security policies. Universities continue to be hesitant. While the government caps the numbers of international students coming into Canada due to immigration and housing challenges, government policies need to be clarified to allow Canadian universities to benefit from TNE opportunities in China. For example, a joint STEM program at the doctoral level may be considered a risk for technological transfer, but is it a big risk at the undergraduate level? Such nuanced clarification may be just what Canadian universities need right now.  

In the 1980s, when China was still a poor country, Canada’s CIDA began to fund development projects in China with a focus on higher education. The goal was to support the development of China’s higher education sector through partnerships with Canadian universities. CIDA’s work in China didn’t stop until 2013. Today, China is a wealthier country with a much stronger higher education sector, leading world research in several key areas, such as AI, quantum tech and clean tech. And yet we have seemingly stopped working with China? Sometimes one has to wonder whether we got our logic right.